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Introduction
The key concept for medical systems is health, which 
is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as „a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity“1. Dis-
ease is mentioned in the definition of health, but it is not 
itself defined by WHO. According to Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH), disease is „A definite pathologic pro-
cess with a characteristic set of signs and symptoms. It 
may affect the whole body or any of its parts, and its etiol-
ogy, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown“2. 
Both health and disease seem to be simple, straightfor-
ward phenomena, but there is no definition for either of 
them that would be universally accepted and undisputed3. 
Many scholars have dealt with health and disease as 
concepts, in different ways. Some scholars analysed the 
term or the word representing the concept, its etimology, 
and relations between the words and meanings of the 
words ‘health’, ‘disease’, ‘illness’ and ‘sickness’4,5. Some of 
them analysed opposing theories of defining health6,7, ef-
fects those concepts have on health-related behavior8 or 
different aspects of health and disease as concepts3, 9-12. A 
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common denominator in all these studies was the conclu-
sion that these concepts are too elusive to be firmly de-
fined13. The other aspect all these analyses share is the 
premise that there is actually a common core of ideas 
about what health and disease are13. However, the major-
ity of the aforementioned research lacks awareness about 
the concept itself. It is our goal to explore potential sig-
nificance of applying some new ideas in cognitive linguis-
tics about the human conceptual system to the components 
of a medical system. 
Medical systems represent the interplay between med-
ical science and the application of that science with the 
purpose of improving human health. Medicine is both an 
art and a science. The other important dichotomy in every 
medical system is the healer/patient dichotomy. It is true, 
however, that 228 million cases of malaria occurred in 
2018 and 405 thousands people died of malaria the same 
year14. Malaria is a preventable and curable disease, so 
the number of cases and deaths caused by malaria, as an 
example, show that there is a gap between the medical 
science and its application. There are many reasons why 
medicine is not as successful as it could be, including po-
182
M. Raguž et al.: Health-Related Cognitive Concepts, Coll. Antropol. 44 (2020) 3: 181–187
litical or economic reasons. But, there are examples when 
the effectiveness of medical knowledge in practice was 
diminished by poor communication between experts and 
patients. For instance, medical anthropologist Sara Crab-
tree and her colleagues worked on prevention of the den-
gue in Malaysia. While talking to the members of the 
affected community, they discovered that the communities 
were not aware of the mosquito-borne disease transmis-
sion, implying they did not focus on defending themselves 
against mosquito bites. That was addressed through ap-
propriate measures created in cooperation with the com-
munities and resulted in success15. The dengue example 
shows it is important to share scientific knowledge or con-
cepts in an appropriate way with the general population. 
It was important for the members of those communities to 
perceive mosquitos as a potential health threat. According 
to this example, medical systems could be more effective 
if they would establish cognitive models of knowledge and 
if they would be able to successfully share that with the 
potential beneficiaries.
Our paper, therefore, has three parts. The first one is 
a very short overview of cognitive linguistics and its ideas 
relevant for our further analysis. The second part is dedi-
cated to trepanation. We will use that procedure as an 
example to show that medical procedures have an under-
lying concept and also to demonstrate how that underlying 
concept can potentially affect the relation between the 
medical experts/healers and the recipients of their medi-
cal art. The third part is the analysis of previous research 
of ‘disease’ as a concept through the prism of disease as a 
prototype category. 
Cognitive Linguistics
The conceptual system can be described as a filter be-
tween the surrounding reality and the thoughts appearing 
in the mind. It is not a process humans are aware of16. It 
is considered in cognitive linguistics that thoughts are 
embodied, imaginative, and having gestalt properties and 
an ecological structure. Conceptual structure can be de-
scribed using cognitive models16-18. One of them is the 
metaphor and it has already been suggested in which way 
medicine is connected to metaphor19. Metaphor is under-
standing and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another16. This does not implicate simply using one word 
instead of another, it also means using a word to denote a 
concept, or the use of a concept to understand another 
concept. There are many examples for that, for instance, 
e.g. TIME IS MONEY – it can be spent like money, it is 
valuable and so on.16 
The other cognitive model significant for our analysis 
is the prototype, central to the prototype theory of lan-
guage18. A prototype is important in conceptual categori-
zation. It means that some members of a category can be 
better examples of that category than the others, even 
when it comes to ‘natural’ categories. For instance, a rob-
in is a better example for the cognitive category ‘bird’ than 
a penguin or a chicken17. Members of a category share 
properties based on the principle of family resemblance17. 
It is important to stress that the prototype theory implies 
gradience of shared properties or attributes rather than 
binarism, in the sense that owning a certain attribute is 
a guarantee of membership or non-membership in a cat-
egory. For instance, if a living creature does not possess 
the capability to fly, that does not automatically mean that 
the creature is not a bird – and a penguin is an example 
for that.  The prototype model is similar to a syndrome in 
medicine. A syndrome has a cluster of symptoms and/or 
signs and not all of them have to be present to establish 
the diagnosis of a certain syndrome. Some symptoms and/
or signs may be prototypical – more central and signifi-
cant in a certain syndrome. For instance, Edwards syn-
drome has a central characteristic sign – trisomy 18, but 
its other diagnostic signs may be the same as in Patau 
syndrome with trisomy 13 as the central sign. Heart de-
fects and cleft lip and palate, for example, appear in both. 
Trepanation – Metaphor in Therapy
All human cultures have medical systems. Archaeo-
logical findings confirm that people took care of their 
health even in prehistoric times. One of the most fascinat-
ing and researched topics on that subject is trepanation 
– a procedure of removing a piece of the skull bone. There 
is material evidence that trepanation was performed in 
Europe (including Croatia),20-24 Asia,25-27 South America 
and Africa27, 28. Five main techniques were used, all with 
the same aim – to create a hole in the head.29 Trepanation 
was widely performed in Europe up until the 1850s. At 
that time the procedure started taking place in hospitals 
causing the mortality rates to become so high (because of 
infections) that it meant an almost certain death, so it 
made no sense to perform them27, 29. However, it was still 
done in Africa until recently and there is an initiative 
trying to make it again popular today in Europe27, 29. 
The motivation to undergo or perform the procedure 
was a matter of interest to scholars. When it comes to pre-
historic people, it is not possible to be completely certain 
why they did it, although there are different theories. Pri-
oreschi, according to Faria20, thinks it is possible that the 
Neolithic people noticed some individuals considered to be 
dead (probably losing consciousness due to a head injury) 
become un-dead, so they tried to achieve the same effect 
themselves - by trepanation. That would explain the post 
mortem trepanations and the interrupted ones – because 
the ‘dead’ may have woken during procedure20. It is consid-
ered by some researchers that the goal of the procedure 
was to let evil spirits out of the head,20, 22, 29 although other 
argue that it was purely therapeutic28. It is not possible to 
be certain why prehistoric people thought they should be 
trephined, but written sources from the past and partici-
pants of recent trepanations can be of help in finding pos-
sible explanations. In ancient Greece philosophy of illness 
was based on the humoral theory according to which imbal-
ance and separation of humours (four bodily fluids) was 
thought to be the cause of diseases30. One of the humours 
is blood. It was thought that it was necessary to let the 
blood out to prevent it from becoming spoiled. Indications 
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Prehistoric people created a procedure which is still 
performed in the 21th century. The metaphor of SKULL IS 
A CONTAINER enabled them to do that and it shows that 
perception or conceptualization of the human body/body 
parts is important in creating new knowledge and ways to 
apply it. Another example which confirms how important 
concepts are in medical science is William Harvey’s discov-
ery of blood circulation. He discovered that blood circulated 
in a closed system and that no new blood was produced and 
sent through vessels to different parts of the body where it 
stayed, as it had been believed until then32. That was one 
of the most significant discoveries in the history of medi-
cine because of the great implications it has had in numer-
ous medical fields, including therapeutic implications. The 
idea that BLOOD IS CIRCULATORY caused a complete 
shift in the perception of the way the human body works 
and that enabled new important discoveries. 
Disease as a Prototype Category
Medical systems around the world operate with the con-
cepts which are in English denoted by words ‘health’ and 
‘disease’. The meaning of the words and the concepts them-
selves can vary depending on the culture or language. The 
English triad ‘disease/sickness/illness’ does not, for exam-
ple, exist in Croatian, where there is only one word ‘bolest’ 
(derived from ‘bol’ meaning ‘pain’) that signifies the same 
conceptual domain33. But, there is a difference between a 
sign – as an objective change of an organism recognized by 
a medical expert, and a symptom – a subjective change or 
a disorder as a patient’s sensation34. Signs belong to disease 
and symptoms to illness. It is the same idea expressed dif-
ferently showing that the same entity – disease is not per-
ceived in the same way by experts and non-experts. Re-
search has shown that certain concepts have influence on 
health-related behavior8 as can be expected since concepts 
govern complete human everyday functioning through the 
way reality is constituted in human minds16.
Disease is a biological and cultural universal, no mat-
ter what word or words are used to signify it. Medical 
experts possess a different concept of disease than lay 
people do35, but the theory of the embodied nature of the 
human conceptual system allows for the assumption that 
there is a common core of the concept, perhaps even across 
different cultures. That common core is what previous 
studies about the concept of disease focused on. One of the 
attempts to define illness resulted in creating ‘the common 
sense model of illness’ (CSM) with the purpose of improv-
ing the patient’s compliance because it became apparent 
that the the patient’s approach to therapy depends on his 
or her perception of illness36. The first CSM was created 
by Leventhal, a health psychologist, and his associates, in 
the 1980s36. Their model comprised four components that 
determined the way disease was perceived – identity, con-
sequences, timeline and cause37. That model was based on 
the perception of the disease by the patients treated for 
hypertension, cancer and those subjected to cardiac by-
pass surgery37. The fact that respondents were actually 
patients with certain health conditions had an effect on 
for trepanation in Hippocratic Corpus are head wounds, 
except for depressed fractures29. On the other hand, there 
are findings of trephined skulls exclusively with prior de-
pressed fractures in Peru28. Galen argued that the evacu-
ation of the humour phlegm was the cure for epilepsy and 
that could be achieved by trepanation31. Europeans per-
formed trepanation in the past in order to let the ‘evil air 
breathe out’ while the Kisii people of South Nynanza in 
Kenya practice trepanation, or at least did until recently, 
as a completely common way to release headache after 
head injury. Some of them do believe it is to let evil spirits 
out, because they believe evil spirits cause the headache29. 
Certain members of the International Trepanation Advo-
cacy Group underwent trepanation and they claim the 
skull should be opened in order for blood to flow more 
freely and to give brain more space because it has a positive 
impact on a person’s wellbeing27. 
It seems indisputable that it was really important to 
people all over the world to find a way to open skulls, be-
cause it is not easy to open a human skull. Several tech-
niques were deployed29. People underwent the procedure 
because they felt certain unpleasant physical sensations 
and they believed the procedure was going to remove 
them. Both the person doing and the person undergoing 
the procedure shared the belief or the idea that the un-
pleasant sensation was caused by the quantity or the qual-
ity of the skull content. In both cases the solution was to 
simply let some content out. That shared belief or the idea 
is a concept. There is an interesting example which shows 
why sharing concepts is important. It is a story from a 
Chinese novel written between 14th and 17th century 
about a Chinese doctor who suggested trepanation to an 
army commander as a cure for his unbearable headache. 
The doctor was executed because the commander thought 
he was trying to kill him, merely for proposing such a 
possibility29. The commander seemed to have not under-
stood the logic of the procedure, although the doctor ex-
plained he would release bad humours that way.
The motivations for the procedure were not unique, nei-
ther were the indications, but people did it in the human 
past all over the world. What links all its versions is the 
underlying metaphor of the skull as a container inside 
which is the content (which is and could have been visible 
by merely watching human remains). Trepanation is nec-
essary when there is too much content or the content is bad 
- in order to let it out or when there is not enough room for 
the content. As Gross argues, when it comes to head inju-
ries, headaches accompany them and they do feel like 
pounding,29 which is the embodiment of the concept and 
people can conclude their skull is a container based on 
physical experience. It is the physical sensation accompa-
nied by the knowledge that the human skull is somewhat 
similar to a container of a sort that could have led people 
to imagine there was some content in the skull that need-
ed to be removed by opening it, or should be given more 
space that way. That idea enabled people to come up with 
techniques to open the skull, to perform that procedure 
and to find people willing to let their skull be opened. It is 
an example of how a conceptual metaphor affects therapy. 
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their perception, making it less universal and Leventhal 
and his associates noticed themselves that the patient’s 
theory of illness changed with experience36. For this rea-
son, Lau, also a health psychologist, and his team added 
cure as the fifth component of the model, because they 
included the perception of common illnesses37. Leventhal 
et al. later adapted their components into identity, time-
line, consequences, cause and control38. However, these 
components are the basis for the classification of diseases, 
they are the features of an entity, not a concept itself. CSM 
answers the question – what kind of a disease is it?, rath-
er than the question – is it a disease? It is applicable after 
it is determined that something is actually a disease, not 
before that. However, the components of the CSM can be 
helpful when investigating shared properties of the mem-
bers of the disease category. 
CSM was created by health psychologists and it does 
not have anything to do with the cognitive models defined 
by cognitive linguistics. After the prototype theory was 
introduced, health psychologists applied it to diseases, but 
not to the category ‘disease’ in the sense of defining it. It 
was applied to discover how disease prototypes relate to 
the sets of symptoms and if a set of symptoms can be rec-
ognized as a particular disease by laypeople and it was 
confirmed that there were certain prototypes for particu-
lar diseases39. Similar research was done by von Lengerke 
who focused on distinctiveness of individual disease pro-
totypes40. 
Like CSM, studies about prototypes of particular ill-
nesses do not question if something is a disease or not, but 
simply assume something is a disease and then question 
what makes it a disease. It is necessary to investigate what 
constitutes the ‘disease’ category first, what are the mem-
bers of that category, and then analyse their properties, 
because the real questions are where is the line between 
disease and non-disease and what is a disease along with 
a question whether ‘disease’ is a prototypical category.
Sadegh-Zadeh advocates the idea that the concept of 
the disease must be defined prescriptively, not descrip-
tively41. He created ‘the prototype resemblance theory of 
disease’42. It is stressed in his work that it is necessary to 
distinguish the ‘disease’ as a general category from indi-
vidual diseases, and also from the patient’s disease state.42 
He recognizes disease as a deontic construct  relative to a 
certain society, which means a particular human condi-
tion may be classified as a disease in a particular society 
and as a non-disease in another one41. The theoretical 
frame is very meticulously constructed in Sadegh-Zadeh’s 
work through dealing with all the aspects pertinent to the 
‘disease’ concept. His ‘prototype resemblance theory of 
disease’ describes the category of ‘disease’ as comprised of 
complex human conditions with the primary characteris-
tic of being action-provoking state42: „A human condition 
is not medically treated because it is a disease, but be-
cause it is a disease to a particular extent that is no longer 
tolerable“42. Sadegh-Zadeh mentions focal diseases as 
those known to the human society for a very long time. 
According to him ‘disease’ category is a multifocal catego-
ry and there is not one prototypical disease. He also men-
tions the Hippocratic Corpus and examples of stroke, 
breast cancer, and angina pectoris42. He considers ‘disease’ 
to be a dynamic category, which has around 50 000 mem-
bers, and „everyday new ones are added (e.g., alcoholism, 
computer game addiction, bulimia, dyslexia, etc.) and 
some other ones are removed (e.g., homosexuality, hyste-
ria, neurasthenia, chlorosis, and drapetomania)“42. Sade-
gh-Zadeh concludes that „ according to this theory, human 
conditions that constitute the category of diseases in 
medicine do not have sufficient and necessary features of 
diseasehood. The category is organized around a number 
of prototypes as its foci such that other human conditions 
that resemble them to particular extents are also included 
in the category to be called diseases“42. Sadegh-Zadeh 
stressed the cultural and the social aspect of the ‘disease’ 
concept.42 As a concept is a cultural construct, it is neces-
sary to know who constructed a certain category. Sadegh-
Zadeh’s category of ‘disease’ belongs to the Western medi-
cine, as stated in his work.42 He has a different approach 
to the ‘disease’ category than, for instance, Rosch had 
when investigating the ‘bird’ category. Sadegh-Zadeh 
claims that ‘disease’ category should be defined prescrip-
tively, not descriptively, as already stated41. He does not 
question what belongs to the category, he defines it. Sade-
gh-Zadeh mentions examples from ancient Greece in his 
work42 and it is a fact that all past and present societies, 
as much as we know, have had medical systems including 
disease and the concept of disease15, 43. Although the ‘dis-
ease’ category is a cultural construct, the human concep-
tual system is embodied16, 17 which enables mutual under-
standing and creates room for the premise that there is a 
part of that category which is universal. It seems that 
Sadegh-Zadeh is implying that the prescribed category 
‘disease’ should actually be the category formed by the 
Western medicine as he defined members of the category 
by terms used in the Western medicine. Such a category 
would be useful, but it is the premise of this analysis that 
there is an intuitive ‘disease’ category universal to all hu-
mans, on the grounds of the embodiment of the human 
conceptual system. 
There is a research testing Sadegh-Zadeh’s hypothesis 
done by Hofmann, an expert in philosophy of medicine, 
stating that disease is not a prototypical category amongst 
health professionals44. In his study health professionals 
were given a list of entities and were asked to rank dis-
eases in accordance to what they consider to be a more 
typical disease44. It is not really clear why he asked that 
question, rather than if something at all was a disease in 
the view of the respondents. Could a typical disease be the 
one which appears more often, for example? The prototype 
is not defined by the attribute of ‘typical’ but with the 
prototype – the typical member. The list of entities, pre-
sumed to be diseases was taken from a study about health 
professionals’ conceptions of prestige related to diseases44. 
In that study it was concluded that a higher level of pres-
tige was related to technologically sophisticated, immedi-
ate and invasive procedures, and also to treating young 
people rather than the elderly, among other45. On the 
other hand, Sadegh-Zadeh claims that Western medicine 
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focal diseases on which the category ‘disease’ is based ex-
ist for a very long time42 and that it is common knowledge 
that old-age is associated with vulnerability to diseases. 
Old-age diseases are more typical. That does not mean 
that the list was not valid for the research about the pos-
sible prototype, but it is unclear why it was not adapted, 
at least, in accordance to Sadegh-Zadeh’s hypothesis. 
Two other studies used methods comparable to Hof-
mann’s. They were also based on a list of entities given to 
respondents, but the question was „is it a disease?“, with-
out the presumption that a certain entity was a disease. 
The first study was conducted by Campbell et al. in 197935. 
followed by a similar study carried out by Erueti et al.46in 
2012. In Campbell et al.’s study respondents were from 
UK and Canada, both laypeople and medical experts. Re-
searchers read 38 terms and asked respondents to mark 
the term with yes or no, and state if they are certain or 
uncertain about their answer35. Erueti et al.’s respondents 
were medical students who were asked to respond wheth-
er in their opinion something was a disease46. 
Hofmann’s respondents were given a list of 62 diseases, 
Campbell et al.’s 38 terms and Erueti et al.’s 36 terms. The 
aforementioned three studies had different respondents in 
regards to their medical education, different lists of dis-
eases and the inquiries were conducted in different set-
tings at different times. Nevertheless, they do share the 
common feature connected to prototype categories which 
is consistency in rating certain members of the category47. 
In all three studies there was a higher level of agreement 
around those entities which were ranked as the most 
highly likely a disease and the most highly likely not a 
disease while in the middle range the level of agreement 
was comparably lower. Entities ranked highest could be 
considered as what Sadegh-Zadeh calls focal diseases or 
central members of the category. Entities consistently 
awarded the status of ‘disease’ in Campbell’s study were 
malaria, tuberculosis, cancer of the lung, syphilis, polio-
myelitis, emphysema, measles, diabetes mellitus and mul-
tiple sclerosis,35; while in the 2012 study those were dia-
betes mellitus, tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, myalgic 
encephalomyelitis, haemophilia, cancer of the lung, mea-
sles, epilepsy, polycystic ovary syndrome and fibromyal-
gia,46. In the Hofmann’s study lung cancer, leukemia, colon 
cancer, myocardial infarction, AIDS, renal failure, mul-
tiple sclerosis and diabetes were consistently considered 
to be typical diseases with less standard deviation for 
participants44. Campbell et al.’s research showed that re-
spondents were consistent in classifying drowning and 
starvation as non-diseases,35 while in Erueti et al.’s study 
such entities were heat stroke, fractured skull, baldness, 
menopause46. In Hofmann’s study standard deviation for 
participants in rating dissidence, drapetomania, homo-
sexuality and pregnancy was approximately as low as it 
was for entities frequently considered to be diseases – less 
than 1 for the first five diseases ranked as most typical 
and it was also less than 1 for homosexuality – ranked 
lowest and then the next four were around 1.544.  It is 
might not be a statistically significant difference, but 
there is a common tendency obvious in all three studies 
toward a higher level of agreement for what is considered 
to be a disease and also for entities considered non-diseas-
es, while there was less agreement around entities for 
which respondents were unsure if they were diseases. It 
is also interesting to note that in Campbell et al.’s re-
search the experts ranked disease in the same order as 
the laypeople, but there was a difference in the level of 
certainty – medical experts were generally more inclined 
to define something as a disease in relation to laypeople. 
That was again most expressed in the middle of the rank-
ing order, that is where there was the highest level of dif-
ference between laypeople and medical experts, while 
there was a higher level of agreement between them 
around the entities ranked the most highly likely to be 
diseases and the most highly unlikely35.
Concepts are determined by frames, such as knowl-
edge, or cultural belief and practices18. For instance, the 
‘bird’ category would not be the same around the world, 
because there are no robins everywhere. But it would be 
expected that some bird with similar features would take 
its place, not a penguin or an ostrich, for example. Sadegh-
Zadeh stresses that ‘disease’ category is culturally condi-
tioned42, and also that occurrence of new diseases changes 
the concept, because the reality of medical systems chang-
es. In the ‘bird’ category robin is a central member, with 
attributes „has feathers, has a beak, lays eggs, chirps, 
flies“42. If robins theoretically do not exist in some part of 
the world, would that mean that there would be no proto-
typical bird? Or, what we consider to be more likely, the 
central member would be a bird with attributes similar to 
a robin, because those attributes are distinctive for the 
‘bird’ category. Following Sadegh-Zadeh, if a robin is cen-
tral to the ‘bird’ category because it has distinctive attri-
butes, there might be types of diseases, those which Sade-
gh-Zadeh calls focal diseases, central to ‘disease’ category. 
Sadegh-Zadeh says „It is thus a multifocal resemblance 
category comprising, around different foci, subcategories 
such as infectious diseases, heart diseases, genetic dis-
eases, and so on“42. Malaria, ranked highest in Campbell 
et al.’s study, was not a part of Hofmann’s and Erueti et 
al.’s list, and diabetes ranked higher in these two studies 
as compared to Campbell et al.’s research. Malaria is not 
widespread nowadays as much as it was in the past, unlike 
diabetes. That could mean epidemic diseases are more 
likely to be considered diseases, they become a part of 
wider human experience by affecting more people. It is 
also a fact that there are entities consistently ranked high 
as diseases in all three studies including lung cancer, dia-
betes and multiple sclerosis. That could also be considered 
a confirmation of the theory that ‘disease’ is a prototype 
category. However, members of a category must not be 
confused with their attributes. It seems that it is more 
likely an entity will be considered a disease if its conse-
quence can be death, for example. When it comes to the 
cause, infectious diseases rank high, together with sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. All these are observations that 
can be made at first glance, but further analysis is neces-
sary in order to create a model of properties that make a 
disease prototypical.
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Conclusion
Since knowledge is important in creating a concept,18 
concepts can differ between different cultures, throughout 
history, or between experts and laypeople. Campbell et 
al.’s research has shown that medical experts are more 
willing to call an entity a disease than lay people35 which 
can have an effect on patients’ compliance. There are 
many examples from medical anthropology showing how 
ideas about health, disease and cure affect health-related 
behavior and health attitudes15, 43, 48. If lay ideas are not 
correspondent with experts’ ideas, it could contribute to a 
patient being less compliant. In other words, if a person 
does not think he or she has contracted a disease, it is not 
likely he or she will commence with therapy. COVID-19 
pandemic raised many questions on compliance and per-
ception of the disease caused by the novel virus, including 
conspiracy theories and falsehoods49-52. Trust in science 
has been noted as important in complying to epidemio-
logical measures50. Knowing what laypeople consider to 
be attributes or characteristics of a disease, what is their 
concept of disease, may contribute to better communica-
tion and explaining the severity of a specific disease. That 
could be achieved by a cross-cultural comparison of what 
people think is a disease and what they do not consider to 
be a disease. Previous research testing the notion of ‘dis-
ease’ has shown a tendency to a higher level of agreement 
about what is most likely a disease and also about what is 
not likely a disease. Cross-cultural research would help 
discover the intuitive, universal model of disease based 
multi focally on prototypical diseases. 
Cognitive concepts govern all human behavior, includ-
ing health-related behavior, and cognitive models can in-
fluence medicine. Perceiving human body through cogni-
tive models affects both patient’s compliance and creating 
therapies, as in the example of trepanation. Understand-
ing and recognizing cognitive concepts can help improve 
application of modern medicine while recognizing and 
analysing the concepts of diseases and the human body 
can have a positive effect on therapy. 
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KONCEPTI POVEZANI SA ZDRAVLJEM S ASPEKTA KOGNITIVNE LINGVISTIKE
S A Ž E T A K
Ljudskim ponašanjem upravljaju koncepti. Koncept je kognitivno predstavljena stvarnost. Prema kognitivnoj lingvis-
tici, postoje kognitivni modeli koji utječu na oblikovanje koncepata u ljudskome umu. Među njih se ubrajaju kognitivna 
metafora i model prototipa. Na primjeru drevnoga postupka – trepanacije, prikazali smo povezanost samoga postupka 
i koncepta ljudske lubanje kao spremnika, što je metafora. Najvažniji su koncepti u medicinskome sustavu – zdravlje i 
bolest. Ne postoji njihova općenito prihvaćena definicija, mada je to bio predmet mnogih istraživanja. Na temelju pre-
thodnih istraživanja moguće je zaključiti da postoje određene prednosti u pristupanju bolesti kao prototipnoj kategoriji. 
U svim dosadašnjim studijama postojala je dosljednost u procjenjivanju toga može li se određeni entitet kvalificirati kao 
bolest, što je karakteristika prototipne kategorije – stupnjevana pripadnost. Entiteti percipirani kao bolesti nisu jed-
naki za sve ispitanike u dosadašnjim studijama, ali dijele određene karakteristike. Veća je vjerojatnost da će neki entitet 
biti smatran bolešću ako može dovesti do smrtnog ishoda, na primjer. Smatramo kako postoji zajednička baza obilježja 
koja određuje bolest kao kognitivnu kategoriju. Daljnja međukulturna istraživanja mogla bi odgovoriti na pitanje koja 
su to obilježja koje entitet mora posjedovati kako bi ga se smatralo bolešću. Naglašavanje takvih obilježja moglo bi 
poboljšati suradljivost pacijenata u slučajevima pojave novih bolesti. 
